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CONSPIRACY DOCTRINE AND SPEECH
OFFENSES: A REEXAMINATION OF
YATES v. UNITED STATES FROM
THE PERSPECTIVE OF UNITED
STATES v. SPOCK
Thomas Church, Jr. t
The current decade has witnessed the application of conspir-
acy law to public enemies as disparate as Daniel Ellsberg' and John
Mitchell. 2 With the recent Watergate conspiracy trial-based on an
indictment which named a sitting President as an unindicted co-
conspirator 3 -it is reasonably clear that whatever the particular
merits or demerits of the conspiracy device, it remains a primary
mode of dealing with crimes highly charged with political over-
tones. But one particularly significant application of conspiracy
law-one which has characterized a disproportionately large
number of twentieth century trials of a political nature4-has been
conspicuous by its absence during the past few years: federal
prosecutors have not appended a conspiracy charge to a crime
involving political speech since the trials of the Chicago Seven5 and
Dr. Benjamin Spock et al.6 in the late sixties.
t Assistant Professor of Political Science, Oakland University. A.B. 1967, Whitman
College; M.A. 1970, Ph.D. 1972, Cornell University.
The author wishes to thank Professors Kurt Hanslowe of the Cornell Law School and
Walter Berns of the University of Toronto for particularly helpful criticism of an earlier
draft of this Article. The staff of the Boalt Hall Library, University of California, Berkeley,
went considerably beyond the requirement of courtesy to visiting scholars during research
there over the past year and deserve special thanks.
I United States v. Ellsberg, Crim. No. 73-9373 (C.D. Cal., May 11, 1973); see N.Y. Times,
May 12, 1973, at 14, col. 5.
2 United States v. Mitchell, Crim. No. 74-110 (D.D.C., Jan. 1, 1975); see N.Y. Times,
Jan. 2, 1975, at 1, col. 8.
3 Cf. N.Y. Times, June 7, 1974, at 1, col. 8; id., March 2, 1974, at 1, col. 5.
4 See cases cited notes 8-10 infra.
5 United States v. Dellinger, Crim. No. 69-180 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 14-15, 1970), rev'd, 472
F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973). This case was brought under the
"1anti-riot" provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. 18 U.S.C. § 2101 (1970). The
indictment charged defendants, inter alia, with both the substantive offense of crossing state
lines "with intent to incite, organize, promote, and encourage" a riot (472 F.2d at 364) and
conspiracy to cross state lines for that purpose. Id. at 348; see J. LuKAs, THE BARNYARD
EPITHET AND OTHER OBSCENITIES (1970).
6 United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969). Defendants were charged,
pursuant to § 12 of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967 (50 App. U.S.C. § 462(a)
(1970)), with conspiracy to "counsel, aid and abet" various evasions of the duties mandated
by the Universal Military Training and Service Act, 50 App. U.S.C. §§ 451-73 (1964). 416
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Compounding the complexities of conspiracy law with those of
speech crime produces constitutional problems of considerably
greater magnitude than those of either area applied separately.
Their convergence, for reasons which should become clear in the
following pages, should be viewed at best with considerable uneasi-
ness. Although it is probably unrealistic to suppose that the current
lull in speech conspiracy proceedings portends a trend, the lull at
least provides an opportunity to piece together the lessons of the
past decade and relate them to the still authoritative Supreme
Court precedents set in an earlier era of political upheaval.
Prosecutions linking conspiracy to seditious speech offenses
have most often occurred in times of societal unrest. The most
notable examples emerged in this century-during World War I
and the accompanying period of preoccupation with criminal anar-
chy,8 immediately following World War II with the specter of
international Communism corrupting American society from
within,9 and recently with the wrenching internal divisions brought
about by the anti-Vietnam war and black liberation movements.10
In terms of generating still viable constitutional precedents, the
most significant federal attempt to use the conspiracy device to
regulate the content of political speech has been the Smith Act of
1940.11 Although not originally designed to be a bulwark against
what was later perceived to be a global Communist conspiracy, the
Smith Act proved eminently adaptable to meet the supposed
threat.1 " It is to the Smith Act cases, particularly to Yates v. United
States,"3 that one must look for the controlling Supreme Court
F.2d at 168; see notes 70-71 and accompanying text infra. The Military Selective Service Act
of 1967, 50 App. U.S.C. §§ 451-73 (1970), was substituted for the Universal Military
Training and Service Act.
' Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494
(1951); see Part II infra.
' See, e.g., Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920); Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616 (4919); Fohrwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47 (1919). See generally W. PRESTON, ALIENS AND DISSENTERS (1963).
9 See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494 (1951); United States v. Silverman, 248 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1957); R. GRIFFITH & A.
THEOHARRIS, THE SPECTER (1974).
'0 The two cause ckl'ebre speech conspiracy trials were, of course, United States v.
Dellinger, Grim. No. 69-180 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 14-15 1970), revd, 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973), and United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969). See
generally H. Z1NN, POSTWAR AMERICA: 1945-1971 (1973).
" 18 U.S.C. §§ 2385, 2387 (1970).
12 The legislation was originally directed at Nazi- and Fascist-oriented groups then
existing in the United States. H. CHASE, SECURITY AND LIBERTY: THE PROBLEMS OF NATIVE
COMMUNISTS 1947-1955, at 25 (1955).
13 354 U.S. 298 (1957). Defendants in Yates were "second-string" Communist Party
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determination of the limits of conspiracy law when applied to
speech offenses. Yates continues to serve as the standard by which
lower courts evaluate Smith Act crimes and, of considerably more
current importance, speech offenses wholly unrelated to the Smith
Act.
Scholarly attention has consistently focused almost singlemind-
edly on the first amendment aspects of speech conspiracy cases,
with the accompanying procedural problems of conspiracy law
relegated to a kind of legal limbo.' 4 But a strong case can be made
for the proposition that many of the free speech difficulties attrib-
uted to speech conspiracy proceedings were a result less of
inherent first amendment transgressions of the substantive speech
crimes themselves, than of improper and slipshod application of
the conspiracy device to an area of the criminal law peculiarly
ill-adapted to its proper functioning.
Anomalies in the conspiracy law standards set do~in in Yates,
critically overlooked in the general rush to praise or decry the
Supreme Court's concurrent demolition of the advocacy provisions
of the Smith Act, surfaced in United States v. Spock' 5 with consider-
ably more ominous overtones. Although the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit narrowed crucial aspects of the Yates
holding in its Spock decision,' 6 other expansive language of the
earlier opinion was applied indiscriminately in Spock, a case with
significant factual differences.1 7 Spock provides a warning that the
proverbial time bomb of loose and expansive precedent set down
in Yates should be defused before another period characterized by
excessive fear of subversion provides the opportunity for its deto-
nation. Analysis of the Yates decision and its subsequent interpreta-
tion in Spock should serve to illuminate many of the fundamental
problems inherent in speech conspiracy charges and to provide
some guidance for more meticulous future application.
leaders charged with the Smith Act offense of advocating the violent overthrow of the
government and organizing a group so to advocate. See notes 42-45 and accompanying text
infra.
14 First amendment problems in speech conspiracy cases received cbnsiderable treat-
ment immediately after the Spock decision was handed down in 1969. See Filvaroff, Conspir-
acy and the First Amendment, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 189 (1972); Nathanson, Freedom of Association
and the Quest for Internal Security: Conspiracy from Dennis to Dr. Spock, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 153
(1970); Note, Criminal Conspiracy and Political Dissent, 44 TUL. L. REV. 587 (1970); Note, The
Logic of Conspiracy, 1970 Wis. L. REv. 191; Note, Conspiracy and the First Amendment, 79 YALE
L.J. 872 (1970).
'5 416 F.2d 165 (lst Cir. 1969).
1 See notes 85-91 and accompanying text infra.
17 See notes 121-26 and accompanying text infra.
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I
THE CRIME OF CONSPIRACY
The gravamen of the conspiracy offense is an agreement by
two or more persons to commit an unlawful act.' 8 Since it is the
prior agreement that is made criminal, conspiracy proceedings may
be initiated in advance of any illegal action beyond formation of
the agreement.' 9 Conspiracy in this sense is an inchoate crime in
which prosecution is aimed at prevention of unlawful action. Most
conspiracy prosecutions, however, originate after commission of a
substantive offense-the rationale for this use of the device being
the state's interest in punishing those enmeshed in illegal group
endeavors who are so removed from any specific criminal act as to
be immune from liability as a principal or accessory. °
The criminalization of such ambiguous, if not in practice
undefinable, behavior is justified by the assumption that a joint
illegal intent is significantly more dangerous than a similar intent
on the part of an individual. 2' Thus, it is only when the separate
intents of two or more persons are unified in the act of agreement
that they are punishable:
So long as [the unlawful] design rests in intention only, it is not
indictable. When two agree to carry it into effect, the very plot is
an act in itself .... The agreement is an advancement of the
intention which each has conceived in his mind; the mind pro-
ceeds from a secret intention to the overt act of mutual consulta-
tion and agreement.22
It is true that agreement may constitute a physical act, at least if the
decision to agree is accomplished through the spoken or written
word. But it is not primarily the speaking or writing of the words
of assent with which the state is concerned: "the criminal act of the
18 See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 453 (1972) [hereinafter cited as LAFAVE &
SCOTT].
19 Current statutory definitions often require the commission of an "overt act"--any
legal or illegal act in furtherance of the conspiratorial objective. This requirement was not
present at common law and seldom places any real restrictions on the point at which the
judicial machinery can be initiated in conspiracy prosecutions. See G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL
LAW 663-713 (2d ed. 1961); Pollock, Common Law Conspiracy, 35 GEo. L.J. 328 (1947).
20 For a comprehensive discussion of the contours of conspiracy law see Developments in
the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Developments
in the Law]. See also LAFAVE & SCOTT 453-95; G. WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 663-713;
Wechsler, Jones & Korn, The Treatment of Inchoate Crime in the Model Penal Code of the American
Law Institute: Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 957 (1961).
21 See LAFAvE & ScoTT 459-60.
22 State v. Carbone, 10 N.J. 329, 336-37, 91 A.2d 571, 574 (1952).
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modern crime [of conspiracy] is not the communication of agree-
ment, but the act of agreement itself, that is, the continuous and
conscious union of wills upon a common undertaking. '23 The "act"
of agreement, then, can be viewed not so much as a physical act in
the traditional sense, than as a conscious relationship existing
among those sharing an illegal purpose.
The tension between agreement as the "act" of mental assent
and agreement as a particular kind of combination or relationship
is pervasive in both judicial and scholarly commentary on conspir-
acy.24 Much of this ambiguity is based on an inherent confusion of
the actus reus of the crime of conspiracy-the agreement-with the
mens rea-individual intent to commit a crime: the two elements are
often inseparable; sometimes they are termed two parts of the
agreement; more frequently they are viewed as distinct agreement
and intent elements of the crime. 25 Legal semantics aside, what
must be proved to establish a conspiracy charge is the existence of
an agreed-upon joint undertaking by two or more individuals
directed at an illegal act; in deference to traditional usage, this
element will be termed "agreement" in the pages that follow.
Additionally, the prosecution must establish the consent of each
individual charged to participate in that endeavor, that is, the
element of "intent." If the undertaking encompasses both legal and
illegal activities-as was held to be the case with respect to the
Communist Party in the Smith Act cases, for example26 -the indi-
vidual intent to be proved must be intent to further the specifically
illegal objects of the conspiracy. The level of abstraction present in
the preceding discussion of the criminal act of conspiracy points
directly to its most pervasive problem: conspiracy is an ill-defined
legal construct that has been aptly described by the late Justice
Jackson as being "so vague that it almost defies description. '27
23 Developments in the Law 926.
24 See 1 NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS
401 & nn. 1-9 (1970); Wechsler, Jones & Korn, supra note 20, at 977-78; Developments in the
Law 933-35.
25 See LAFAVE & ScoTr 464-66.
26 See Part 11 infra.
27 Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 446 (1949) (concurring opinion). Justice
Jackson also noted that
[a] co-defendant in a conspiracy trial occupies an uneasy seat. There generally will
be evidence of wrongdoing by somebody. It is difficult for the individual to make
his own case stand on its own merits in the minds of jurors who are ready to believe
that birds of a feather are flocked together. If he is silent, he is taken to admit it and
if, as often happens, co-defendants can be prodded into accusing or contradicting
each other, they convict each other.
Id. at 454.
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If conspiracy is difficult to define in theory, it is even more
problematic to establish at trial. The crime, in the trenchant under-
statement of one of its leading critics, is "heavily mental in compo-
sition.128 Because conspiracy incriminates what is essentially a state
of mind, convincing proof is obviously rather difficult to come by.
The prosecution must establish both a common design aimed at an
illegal act and the intent on the part of each of the accused to
participate in the specifically illegal aspects of that endeavor. Sel-
dom will there exist a written document of agreement; even if such
direct evidence does exist, its coming into the hands of the au-
thorities is highly unlikely. When conspiracy proceedings are in-
itiated in their preventative role prior to accomplishment of the
illegal objective, clear evidence of the elements of the offense
becomes even more elusive.
Judges have attempted to deal with the difficulties involved in
establishing a conspiracy charge by modifying evidence rules and
loosening standards of proof. Thus, some of the basic protections
of the hearsay rule are not available to the conspiracy defendant.
After the prosecution has made out a prima facie case for the
existence of a conspiratorial agreement, any statement made by
one conspirator is admissible against any other conspirator.29
Moreover, in some areas of conspiracy law-most notably in anti-
trust litigation-the already ill-defined agreement requirement is
further weakened by allowing a finding of conspiracy to rest
heavily on what is termed "consciously parallel action." 30 The
practical effect is clear: unfair conviction is obviously more likely
when a conspiracy defendant can be held accountable for words
that he may not have authorized spoken by others, and when he
can be held to have "agreed" with other persons to pursue a joint
course of conduct principally on the basis of his awareness that
their respective actions were in fact "parallel." The due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments require that guilt
be personal rather than associational, 3 ' and it is precisely this
28 Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 624, 635 (1941). "In the long
category of crimes there is none, not excepting criminal attempt, more difficult to confine
within the boundaries of definitive statement than conspiracy." Id. at 624.
29 See Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy, 52 MICH. L. REv. 1159 (1954); Morgan, The
Rationale of Vicarious Admissions, 42 HARV. L. REv. 461, 464-66 (1929).
30 Although conscious parallelism is not, in itself, sufficient to establish conclusively a
conspiratorial agreement, it is generally given substantial weight as circumstantial evidence
of such an agreement. Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346
U.S. 537, 540-41 (1954).
3 The Supreme Court has declared that
[iln our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when the imposition of punishment on
[Vol. 60:569
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requirement of individual guilt that can suffer most from the
excesses of an over-zealous prosecutor or a pliant judge. These
problems, together with the already-noted vague definition of the
crime, combine to validate Judge Learned Hand's apt characteriza-
tion of conspiracy as the "darling of the modern prosecutor's
nursery, '3 2 often to the very real detriment of fair and justifiable
procedures.
Because of the dangers inherent in conspiracy law, caution
should accompany its application to the simplest substantive of-
fense. Even conspiracy to rob a bank, despite the relatively clear
focus provided by an unambiguous conspiratorial objective, can
involve considerable complication and opportunity for unfairness
to the defendants. When the crime of conspiracy-already one step
removed from observable action-is applied to a substantive crime
involving speech uttered with a necessary intent or having a particu-
lar tendency, the law and its traditional safeguards are even
further removed from the concrete world of observable action into
what can easily become a morass of highly subjective and ultimately
unreliable inferences.
As stated above, a conspiratorial agreement must aim at con-
duct constituting a crime. Since only very limited kinds of speech
may be made criminal consistent with the protections of the first
amendment, an indictable speech conspiracy must involve an
agreement specifically aimed at expression in one of those particular
categories. The difficult question of whether a particular instance
of public expression may be punishable consistent with statutory or
constitutional guidelines, however, is distinct from the equally
perplexing question of whether the illegal aspects of that expres-
sion may be attributed to each individual of the group alleged to be
conspiratorially responsible for it. It is the latter due process
question of conspiracy law, often critically ignored in the emphasis
on first amendment problems of crimes penalizing speech, which is
the central conicern of the present discussion. The relevant query
is: "Was conspiratorial liability for allegedly illegal speech assigned
to the defendants according to proper substantive and procedural
standards?" It will be argued that Yates provides deficient standards
by which to assign conspiratorial liability in speech cases. When
a status or on conduct can only be justified by reference to the relationsbip of that
status or conduct to other concededly criminal activity... that relationship must be
sufficiently substantial to satisfy the concept of personal guilt in order to withstand
attack under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 224-25 (1961).
3 Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925).
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applied to a significantly different factual situation such as that of
Spock, those faulty standards become even more destructive of the
personal guilt guarantees of the due process clauses.
II
THE Dennis AND Yates SPEECH CONSPIRACY STANDARDS
The speech-related sections of the Smith Act consist of the
so-called "advocacy"33 and "membership" 34 clauses. The former
makes it a crime to advocate violent overthrow of the government
of the United States, the latter, to become a member of a group
that would so advocate. Dennis v. United States,35 decided in 1951,
represented the first major effort of the federal government to
prosecute members of the Communist Party under conspiracy
counts applied to these provisions. It resulted in a major Supreme
Court opinion setting out the constitutional limits of the Smith
Act's application.3 6 The indictment, handed down in 1948, charged
that Dennis, along with eleven other members of the National
Board of the Communist Party,
unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly conspired with each other
and with other persons unknown to the grand jury (1) to or-
ganize as the Communist Party of the United States of America a
society, group and assembly of persons who teach and advocate
the overthrow and destruction of the Government of the United
States by force and violence, and (2) knowingly and willfully to
advocate and teach the duty and necessity of overthrowing and
destroying the Government of the United States by force and
violence.37
The defendants were found guilty as charged, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit upheld the conviction without sig-
nificant modification,3 8 and the Supreme Court of the United
33 The Act punishes anyone who "knowingly or willfully advocates, abets, advises, or
teaches the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the
government of the United States . .. by force or violence" with a fine of up to $20,000,
imprisonment for as many as 20 years, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1970).
31 A person who "becomes or is a member of, or affiliates with, any such society, group,
or assembly of persons, ['who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of
any such government by force or violence'], knowing the purposes thereof" is subject to the
same penalty as the advocate of violent overthrow. Id.
35 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
36 Id.
37 Id. at 561 n.1.
-8 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950).
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States, in a set of opinions providing a striking example of judicial
obfuscation and confusion, affirmed.
A major obstacle to analysis of the Dennis case in terms of
conspiracy law is the virtual absence of an authoritative definition
of exactly what kind of speech the Smith Act punishes. Both the
charge of conspiring to advocate violent revolution and the charge
of conspiring to organize a group for this purpose depend at
bottom on the meaning given to the term "advocate." Obviously,
without an unambiguous definition of the substantive offense-the
particular speech for which the defendants might be held crimi-
nally liable-any coherent evaluation of the conspiracy standards
applied to that crime is almost impossible. The closest either the
court of appeals or the Supreme Court majority came in Dennis to a
definition of the speech prohibited by the Smith Act was a declara-
don by Chief Justice Vinson of what is not the focus of that Act: the
Smith Act "is directed at advocacy, not discussion." 39
Not suprisingly, a bewildering series of lower court interpreta-
tions followed on the heels of Detinis.4 ° The trial court in a Smith
Act action against "second string" Communist Party leaders in
California subscribed to a particularly expansive interpretation of
Dennis.4 It was the ultimate appeal of this case to the United States
Supreme Court in 1957 that produced the current controlling
precedent on issues involving conspiracy and seditious speech
offenses, Yates v. United States.42
Unlike the Dennis defendants, who as members of the National
Board of the Communist Party constituted a clearly definable
group, those charged in Yates were a disjointed collection of middle
range officials, operating in different California cities in varied
slots within the Party hierarchy. They were charged under the
Smith Act with the same two counts put forward against Dennis
and his co-defendants: conspiracy (1) to advocate violent revolution
and (2) to organize a group to advocate violent revolution. The
trial judge read the Supreme Court ruling in Dennis as permitting
"advocacy" to be made out "simply by showing that what was said
dealt with forceable overthrow and that it was uttered with a
specific intent to accomplish that purpose. '43 Because he failed to
9 341 U.S. at 502.
40 See Mollan, The Smith Act Prosecutions: The Effect of the Dennis and Yates Decisions, 26 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 705 (1965).
41 United States v. Yates, 107 F. Supp. 412 (S.D. Cal. 1952), affd, 225 F.2d 146 (9th Cir.
1955), rev'd, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); see note 43 infra.
42 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
43 Id. at 317. The Yates court of appeals also interpreted the Dennis standard broadly:
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charge the jury that the crime required a finding of advocacy in the
form of incitement to violent acts, the charge that was delivered by
the trial judge in Dennis but not made an explicit requirement in
Chief Justice Vinson's subsequent majority opinion, the Supreme
Court overturned all the Yates convictions. 44 Additionally, the
Court interpreted the term "organize" in the second count nar-
rowly. Since the Communist Party was held to have been "or-
ganized" no later than 1945, its formation fell outside the ap-
plicable statute of limitations, and charges on that count were
quashed. 45
Most significant from the perspective of the relevant standards
for speech conspiracy crimes, the Yates Court, in a majority opinion
by Justice Harlan, took the crucially important step of reviewing
the evidence presented at the trial to determine if the case against
any of the defendants was "so clearly insufficient that their acquit-
tal should be ordered. ' 46 The Court ultimately ordered acquittals
for five of the fourteen defendants and in so doing laid down
implicit standards of evidence for the guidance of lower courts in
similar cases. 47 These standards, particularly those relating to con-
spiratorial intent, present substantial problems.
As has been previously noted,48 any evaluation of the conspir-
acy law standards applied in Dennis is made almost impossible by
the absence of a clear definition of the substantive offense-
seditious advocacy-to which the conspiracy charge was appended.
Probably the major accomplishment of the Yates court was its
articulation of the elements of the crime of advocating violent
revolution: "those to whom the advocacy is addressed must be
urged to do something, now or in the future, rather than merely to
believe in something."49 The crime of advocacy of revolution must
therefore consist of incitement to present or future violent acts.
And, as a necessary implication apparently ignored by the Court, a
conspiracy count appended to the advocacy charge so defined then
The indictment did not charge that this literature on its face bore a sinister
meaning, nor even that the individual defendants gave it a sinister meaning.
Interpretations of the teachings of the Communist Party have no relevance because
that entity was not on trial .... Defendants individually must have been found to
have had the intent of immediate destruction [of the government by force or
violence].
225 F.2d 146, 161 (9th Cir. 1955).
44 354 U.S. at 312-27.
45 Id. at 312.
46 Id. at 328-29.
47 Id. at 327-34; see text accompanying notes 53-62 infra.
48 See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
49 354 U.S. at 324-25 (emphasis in original).
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requires a finding (1) that there existed an agreed-upon joint
undertaking by two or more individuals directed at violence-
inciting speech, and (2) that each defendant consented to support
the joint effort to produce that specific form of illegalexpression.
The Government's theory of conspiracy in Yates was not fun-
damentally different from its previously successful approach in the
Dennis case. The Communist Party became the "agreed-upon joint
undertaking," thereby satisfying the agreement requirement. Indi-
vidual intent to further the illegal aspects of the agreement, in the
Government's view, was established by membership and leadership
in the Party.50 The Government's thesis, then, was based on two
evidentiary assumptions: (1) that the Communist Party consisted of
a joint undertaking directed at least in part at violence-inciting
speech, and (2) that all members, or at least all leaders, shared and
intended to support that specific speech-related goal.
The Supreme Court rejected the Government's theory not
because of any inherent doctrinal insufficiency, but rather because
of the lack of evidence offered in its support. It found the Gov-
ernment's "sporadic showing" of illegal advocacy by the Party
insufficient "to justify viewing the Communist Party as the nexus
between [the] petitioners and the conspiracy charged."51 Since the
Party was not shown to be sufficiently involved in illegal speech to
constitute the necessary joint illegal undertaking, membership or
leadership in the Party was obviously irrelevant to the question of
whether the defendants had conspired to further unlawful expres-
sion.52
Although the record did not support the Government's
theory, the Supreme Court relied on more conventional conspiracy
doctrine to uphold its contention that there was sufficient evidence
to allow a new trial for certain of the defendants.53 Justice Harlan's
reasoning in the majority opinion proceeded in three steps. He
5' In the Government's view,
[t]his fact of petitioners' undoubted Party leadership, when considered in conjunc-
tion with the Party's higbly disciplined character and its extreme secrecy... suffices
to show that each of the petitioners had the knowledge and the intent with which
they were charged.
Brief for the United States at 106, Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
51 354 U.S. at 330.
52 That the Court was well prepared to support the Government's theory, on a proper
record indicative of illegal Party advocacy, was to be made clear in subsequent cases. See
Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961). The Scales Court found "no great difference
between a charge of being a member in a group which engages in criminal conduct and
being a member of a large conspiracy, many of whose participants are unknown or not
before the court." Id. at 226 n.18.
53 354 U.S. at 331-33.
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first asserted that the existence of a joint undertaking to advocate
violent overthrow was supported in the record. Specifically, tes-
timony describing Party classes in San Francisco and Los Angeles
"where there occurred what might be considered to be the systema-
tic teaching and advocacy of illegal action which is condemned by
the statute,' 54 was held to be indicative of the possibility that illegal
"advocacy of action" was in fact occurring. Second, he cited evi-
dence "linking these nine petitioners to that sort of advocacy. '55
Testimony concerning the relationship of the boards upon which
the nine sat to the Party schools was cited, as was the "close
association" of various of the nine with teachers in the schools.56 As
the third and last step in the argument, Justice Harlan asserted
that
all of these nine petitioners were shown either to have made
statements themselves, or apparently approved statements made
in their presence, which a jury might take as some evidence of
their participation with the requisite intent in a conspiracy to
advocate illegal action.57
These two final steps, particularly the last, raise some fundamental
questions as a matter of conspiracy law, independent of whatever
free speech problems may inhere in the first step.
In essence, the Court appears to be saying that a defendant
may be found guilty of conspiracy to incite violent revolutionary
action by a showing that (1) such incitement was taking place, (2)
the defendant was in some way associated with those involved in
the incitement, and (3) he "apparently approved" a statement
made in his presence indicative of illicit intent. If the schools were
in fact producing, or were directed toward producing, specifically
illegal speech, the agreement element of conspiracy would present
few problems: the ongoing enterprise of the Party schools was clearly
the result ofjoint action, of an agreement concluded by someone. The
serious questions in the case concern whether or not those individuals
on trial could be held personally responsible for whatever illegal
advocacy went on in the schools. The problem, in other words, was
with the element of intent: whether the defendants had consented to
participate in the undertaking aimed at illegal speech.
54 Id. at 331. For purposes of the present discussion it will be assumed that at least part
of the speech arising out of the Party schools was in fact punishable under relevant statutory
and constitutional requirements.
55 Id. at 332.
56 Id. at 333.
57 Id.
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The Court required some evidence establishing the "requisite
intent," but exactly what this intent element encompasses is not
altogether clear. The Supreme Court in Dennis had previously
added, through statutory interpretation, a requirement that those
found guilty of Smith Act speech crimes possess "specific" intent to
bring about violent overthrow of the government. 58 Presumably,
then, after Dennis, individuals found guilty of conspiracy to commit
those crimes must be shown not only to possess intent to participate
in joint advocacy of violent overthrow, but also intent to participate
in the overthrow itself. Clearly the two intents are not the same-
intent to advocate violent revolution cannot be inferred directly
from the intent to overthrow.5 9
Whatever intent was being discussed in the Yates Court's third
step, however, the record would seem incapable of establishing any
intent at all. Mere presence at a meeting at which someone else
made an incriminating statement, regardless of what was said, is
hardly a satisfactory demonstration of any intent beyond the sim-
ple intent to be at the meeting. Traditional rules for conspiracies
having purely illegal purposes may permit such an inference of
intent from statements of persons alleged to be co-conspirators:
presence at a meeting at which bank robberies were being planned
might be supportive of an inference of intent to rob banks, for
example. But the meetings in Yates consisted almost entirely of
protected political discussion; they were neither planning sessions
for future acts of revolution nor were they devoted to preparing
for the expression of illegal speech advocating revolution. The
meetings described in the Government's summary of the Yates
evidence, which presumably emphasized those facts believed to be
the most damning, were so innocuous as hardly to suffice in
incriminating the speakers, let alone a mere listener.6 0
58 "We hold that the statute requires as an essential element of the crime proof of the
intent of those who are charged with its violation to overthrow the Government by force and
violence." 341 U.S. at 499.
59 In the words of a subsequent circuit court opinion construing the Smith Act:
While it is certainly within the realm of fancy that men who eventually want violent
insurrection will presently teach the necessity of such behavior, it is hardly strong
proof of such teaching. For would-be revolutionaries are at least as likely, as an
abstract proposition, to adopt the tactic in years of unpopularity of decrying the use
of violence and posing as peaceful social reformers ....
The use of lawful speech, an agreement to share abstract revolutionary doctrine, and an
agreement to use force against the Government in the future do not add up to a conspiracy
presently to use illegal language.
United States v. Silverman, 248 F.2d 671, 686 (2d Cir. 1956) (emphasis added).
60 Two meetings were given the most emphasis. At one, an 83 year old woman,
"Mother" Bloor, told those present that "the day of the revolution was nigh" and that "arms"
1975]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Two intents are elements of the conspiracy offense charged
against the Yates defendants: intent to further illegal advocacy of
revolution in the form of incitement to violent acts, and the specific
intent added by Dennis, intent to overthrow the government
through violence. Presence at a meeting at which either illegal
advocacy of revolution or the revolution itself was being plotted
might support an inference of either intent, although such an
inference would surely be rebuttable. 6t But the Yates meetings were
not singlemindedly-if at all--directed to criminal preparation.
The major portion of the meetings described in the record con-
sisted of undeniably legal political discussion. Because of that fact
alone, criminal intent cannot be implied from presence at such a
meeting simply because the meeting was conducted under the
auspices of the Communist Party.62
Intent in conspiracy law is intimately tied to due process
requirements of finding individual rather than associational guilt. 63
Once the Supreme Court refused the Government's theory that the
Communist Party itself comprised the conspiracy, both agreement
and individual intent to further illegal speech had to be clearly
demonstrated in order to implicate a defendant vicariously in
criminal activity in which he -did not directly participate. The key
element in the process which permits this rather indirect assign-
ment of criminal responsibility is the intent of each conspirator to
further the joint illegal endeavor-in this case advocacy of revolu-
were in readiness. She said she hoped to "live to see this bloody battle through," predicting it
would be "a wonderful revolution" with "blood flowing in the streets." Brief for the United
States, supra note 50, at 16. The Government neglected to add other testimony to the effect
that Mother Bloor also discussed "the great loss that this country had incurred upon the
death of Mr. Roosevelt"-that "we had lost our best friend, that he has stood [sic] beside us,
and that we don't know about Truman, that we are going to give him a trial." Record, vol.
19, at 8002-03, Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
The other testimony, apparently regarded as particularly persuasive by the Govern-
ment, involved words by one defendant in the presence of several others that he "wanted to
see the overthrow of this lousy system just as much as anybody else present, but there was a
time and place for militant action and it had not arrived yet." Brief for the United States,
supra note 50, at 41. An implication of intent to overthrow, even on the part of the speaker,
is hardly supportable on this kind of record. An intent to incite violent revolution on the part
of a person merely present when the words were spoken is clearly not demonstrated.
6 Circumstantial evidence provides the basis for most conspiracy convictions. See
LAFAVE & ScowT 457-58; Developments in the Law 984.
62 An earlier Supreme Court decision had articulated the standard as follows:
The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are to be
preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is held but as to its
purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances
transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects.
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937).
63 See note 31 supra.
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tion in the form of incitement to violent acts. The Supreme Court's
words in Dennis may have belied its actions, but the words still
describe the appropriate role of the Supreme Court in reviewing
such problematic cases:
Where there is doubt as to the intent of the defendants, the
nature of their activities, or their power to bring about the evil,
this Court will review the convictions with the scrupulous care
demanded by our Constitution. 64
In Yates there was indeed doubt regarding "the intent of th~e
defendants," but the Court's "scrupulous care" was conspicuous by
its absence.
The Yates case affords a reasonably clear definition of the
limits of the crime of revolutionary advocacy proscribed by the
Smith Act and, by implication, of the intent that must therefore be
present to make out a conspiracy charge. Unfortunately, the major-
ity opinion does not clearly set out the necessity to establish intent
to further revolutionary advocacy as an element distinct from the
intent to participate in violent overthrow. And the evidence stan-
dards set down for the establishment of intent-regardless of
which intent is being discussed-are demonstrably insufficient to
allow imputation of guilt in a case so proximate to the restricted
area of first amendment freedoms. These deficiencies might not
warrant serious concern if the significance of Yates were confined to
the Smith Act. As experience has demonstrated, the Yates decision
effectively reduced the advocacy clause of that statute to impo-
tence. 65 But Yates represents the last occasion on which the Su-
preme Court gave systematic treatment to a speech conspiracy case.
As such, it is of considerable contemporary importance, and its
shortcomings cannot safely be relegated to the anthologies.
Both majority and dissenting opinions by the Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit in United States v. Spock 66 looked to the
Communist cases, 67 particularly Yates, as controlling precedent,
64 341 U.S. at 516.
65 Almost every advocacy clause case pending when Yates was handed down resulted in
a dismissal, either by motion of the Government, or by the district court, "thus ending its
enforcement for the foreseeable future." Nathanson, supra note 14, at 159. Similar emascula-
tion of the membersbip clause was brought about by Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290
(1961). For a complete history of Smith Act prosecutions since Dennis see Mollan, supra note
40.
66 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969).
67 The court cited, inter alia, Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961); Scales v.
United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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even though the Spock case dealt with a very different sort of
"political criminal" from those in Dennis or Yates. Because the case
never reached the Supreme Court, the law set down is of tentative
general applicability. But the case does provide the only contem-
porary interpretation of the Smith Act cases. Most important,
however, Spock represents the most systematic statement we have of
the kind of evidence necessary to establish intent in a speech
conspiracy case. Unfortunately, the stringency of its intent re-
quirements68 is accompanied by a singularly loose and amorphous
conception of the agreement aspect of conspiracy. 69 Because of the
clear importance of Spock as a contemporary example of gov-
ernmental action against domestic radicals, both its strengths and
weaknesses deserve careful examination, particularly if its lessons
are to serve as a starting point for a more authoritative future
Supreme Court pronouncement on the application of conspiracy to
speech crimes.
III
United States v. Spock
Dr. Benjamin Spock and four others-Reverend William
Sloane Coffin, Jr., Mitchell Goodman, Michael Ferber, and Marcus
Raskin-were indicted in 1967 under provisions of the Military
Selective Service Act of 1967.70 The indictment charged that the
defendants conspired among themselves and with others to
counsel, aid and abet diverse Selective Service registrants to ...
neglect, fail, refuse and evade service in the armed forces of the
United States and all other duties required of registrants under
the Universal Military Training and Service Act . . . and the
rules, regulations and directions duly made pursuant to said Act
... to... fail and refuse to have in their personal possession at
all times their registration certificates [and] . . . valid notices of
classification [and conspired to] . . . unlawfully, willfully and
knowingly hinder arid interfere, by any means, with the ad-
ministration of the Universal Military Training and Service
Act.71
The Government's case against the defendants centered on a
number of undisputed facts. A document entitled A Call to Resist
68 See text accompanying notes 87-99 infra.
69 See text accompanying notes 100-26 infra.
70 50 App. U.S.C. § 462 (a) (1970).
71 416 F.2d 165, 168 (1st Cir. 1969) (footnotes omitted). The Universal Military
Training and Service Act, 50 App. U.S.C. §§ 451-73 (1964), was replaced by the Military
Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 App. U.S.C. §§ 451-73 (1970).
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Illegitimate Authority (hereinafter termed the Call) was written in
part by Coffin and Spock, and signed by them, Goodman, and
ultimately several hundred others. The Call, an accompanying
cover letter requesting signatures and support, and a document
written by Goodman entitled Civil Disobedience Against the War were
publicized at a press conference in New York City at which Good-
man, Spock, Coffin, and others spoke. There it was announced
that further activities were planned, including nationwide turn-ins
of draft cards to be surrendered to the Attorney General of the
United States. Ferber and Coffin participated in a subsequent
ceremony at the Arlington Street Church in Boston at which draft
cards were burned or turned in. Four days later, Ferber, Spock,
Goodman, and Coffin attended a Washington demonstration at
which an unsuccessful attempt was made to tender to the Attorney
General some of the draft cards received in ceremonies similar to
the Boston episode. 72
Because the Call, the cover letter, and the Civil Disobedience
document constituted the crux of the case, they deserve detailed
descriptions. 7 3 The Call, addressed "[t]o the young men of America,
to the whole of the American people, and to all men of good will
everywhere," began with a general condemnation of the war in
Vietnam on both legal and moral grounds. It then asserted that
"every free man has a legal right and a moral duty . . .to avoid
collusion with it, and to encourage others to do the same."'74 There
followed a description of the ways various individuals were resist-
ing the war-some legal and some patently illegal.75 Probably the
key section of the document was directed toward these acts of
resistance:
We believe that each of these forms of resistance against
illegitimate authority is courageous and justified....
We will continue to lend our support to those who under-
take resistance to this war. We will raise funds to organize draft
resistance unions, to supply legal defense and bail, to support
72 416 F.2d at 168.
7' The Call and cover letter are set out in their entirety in the appendix to the First
Circuit's opinion. Id. at 192-94.
74 Id. at 192.
7' Among those already in the armed forces some are refusing to obey specific
illegal and immoral orders.., some are absenting themselves without official leave.
Among those not in the armed forces ... some are refusing to be inducted. Among
both groups some are resisting openly and paying a heavy penalty, some are
organizing more resistance within the United States and some have sought
sanctuary in other countries.
Id. at 192-93.
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families and otherwise aid resistance to the war in whatever ways
may seem appropriate. 76
The cover letter stated:
Those who have signed, including ourselves, have pledged them-
selves to extend material and moral support to young men who
are directly resisting the war. Many of us are further committed
to joining those young men in acts of civil disobedience. 77
It requested signatures and additional funds, and for the addressee
"to commit [him]self to the fullest possible extent to the tasks of
resisting the war. and bringing it to a halt. '7' The most significant
section of Goodman's Civil Disobedience Against the War stated:
"Now publicly we will demonstrate, side by side with these young
men, our determination to continue to [aid, abet and counsel them
against conscription]. 7 9
The trial jury found all defendants but Raskin guilty as
charged.80 The other defendants immediately appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, an action
which resulted in the reversal of all convictions on grounds unre-
lated to the present analysis."' Upon review of the evidence, the
appeals court also directed acquittals for Spock and Ferber on
grounds of lack of evidence;8 2 the evidence was deemed sufficient
to justify a retrial for Goodman and Coffin,8 3 although the Gov-
ernment never chose to reinstitute proceedings. 84
7r Id. at 193.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 175. See text accompanying note 92 infra.
80 416 F.2d at 168.
81 The trial judge had put ten special questions to thejury to be answered "Yes" or "No."
These questions were posed in addition to the general issue of "guilty or not guilty." The first
question asked:
Does -the Jury find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants unlawfully,
knowingly and wilfully conspired to counsel Selective Service registrants to know-
ingly and wilfully refuse and evade service in the armed forces of the United States
in violation of Section 12 of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967?
Id. at 180. Subsequent questions substituted for the words "counsel" and "abet" the word
"aid," and then dealt similarly with "notices of classification" and "registration certificates."
The final question dealt separately with the conspiracy count of the indictment. Id.
The circuit court held that the procedure constituted prejudicial error, expressing
particular concern over
the subtle, and perhaps open, direct effect that answering special questions may
have upon the jury's ultimate conclusion. There is no easier way to reach, and
perhaps force, a verdict of guilty than to approach it step by step. A juror, wishing
to acquit, may be formally catechized.
Id. at 182.
12 Id. at 178-79.
83 Id. at 176-78.
'4 See J. MITFORD, THE TRIAL OF DR. SPOCK xiii (2d ed. 1970).
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The circuit court's evaluation of the evidence to determine if
any of the defendants should be acquitted without possibility of
retrial was similar to the task undertaken by the Supreme Court in
Yates.85 And, as in the Yates case, this action resulted in enunciation
of evidentiary standards for similar speech conspiracy cases. As will
be discussed below, the standards relative to intent represent a
genuine improvement over the generalities of Yates. Unfortunately,
the same cannot be said for the court's analysis of conspiratorial
agreement.
The circuit court placed special emphasis on the intent ele-
ment because it viewed the agreement charged as "both bifarious
and political within the shadow of the First Amendment." 6 The
court announced the following test for determining the sufficiency
of evidence of intent:
[W]e hold that an individual's specific intent to adhere to the
illegal portions [of the agreement] may be shown in one of three
ways: by the individual defendant's prior or subsequent unam-
biguous statements; by the individual defendant's subsequent
commission of the very illegal act contemplated by the agree-
ment; or by the individual defendant's subsequent legal act if
that act is "clearly undertaken for the specific purpose of render-
ing effective the later illegal activity which is advocated. 18 7
This three-part rule for defining evidence sufficiently indicative of
intent in a speech conspiracy case represents the first time an
appellate court has seriously grappled with the issue.88
Although purporting to follow Dennis and Yates, it is evident
that the Spock majority tightened considerably the standards by
which conspiratorial intent can be satisfactorily established. Indeed,
the court majority was quite clear in repudiating use in speech
cases of precisely the kind of evidence held permissible in Yates to
establish intent-statements of another person:8 9
Adopting the panoply of rules applicable to a conspiracy having
purely illegal purposes, the government introduced numerous
8- 354 U.S. at 327; see note 45 and accompanying text supra.
86 416 F.2d at 173.
87 Id. (citation and footnote omitted).
88 The majority opinion cited the intent requirements laid down in Heuman v. United
States, 298 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1961), as precedent for the newly-announced evidence
standards. 416 F.2d at 173 n.19. Hellman, however, arose under the membership clause of
the Smith Act (18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1970)), rather than the advocacy clause (id.), under which
Dennis and Yates were prosecuted. The only intent required to be demonstrated under the
membership clause is intent to overthrow, not intent to incite overthrow. Scales v. United
States, 367 U.S. 203, 221-22 (1961). Thus the intent standard of Hellman dealt with action
and not with the intent to speak relevant to Spock.
89 See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
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statements of third parties alleged to be co-conspirators. This was
improper. The specific intent of one defendant in a case such as
this is not ascertained by reference to the conduct or statements
of another even though he has knowledge thereof . ... The
metastatic rules of ordinary conspiracy are at direct variance with
the principle of strictissimi juris.90
The Spock court applied these standards in such a way as to allow
retrial of Goodman and Coffin because of their own "prior or
subsequent unambiguous statements." 91
The statements held to constitute sufficient support for intent
were at least superficially unambiguous. The political tract entitled
Civil Disobedience Against the War written by Goodman and signed by
both stated:
The draft law commands that we shall not aid, abet or
counsel men to refuse the draft. But as a group of the clergy has
recently said .... when young men refuse to allow their con-
science to be violated by an unjust law and a criminal war, then it
is necessary for their elders-their teachers, ministers, friends-
to make clear their commitment... to aid, abet and counsel them
against conscription. Most of us have already done this privately.
Now publicly we will demonstrate, side by side with these young
men, our determination to continue to do S0.92
Both Goodman and Coffin also made statements paralleling this
tract in public speeches.93 Statements of this sort, unlike the Call,
directly describe the speaker's intent with respect to the object of
the conspiracy charged-counseling, aiding, and abetting draft law
violations.94 Evidence of this nature was conspicuously absent from
90 416 F.2d at 173 (footnote omitted).
91 Id.
92 Id. at 175 (emphasis in original).
93 Goodman, for example, stated at the Washington demonstration that members of the
older generation were present
because we want specifically to form an alliance with these young men which we will
persist in, at least as long as the war lasts, in which we will encourage them and aid
and abet and counsel them in every way we know how.
Id. at 177 (emphasis supplied by court).
91 A discussion of the first amendment ramifications of using public speech as evidence
of conspiratorial intent is beyond the scope of this analysis. It need only be stated here that
public speech so directly indicative of an illegal intent is no more deserving of first
amendment protection than a public declaration of a revolutionary to the effect that "I have
set off one bomb; 1 intend to set off more." The argument that use of such evidence in a
criminal trial would produce a "chilling effect" on other persons' exercise of protected free
speech amounts to little more than the assertion that public speakers who either have
committed or intend to commit illegal acts should not be inhibited in publicly admitting their
illegal acts and intentions. There is little to recommend such a position as a first amendment
mandate protective of free debate on issues of public concern. Judge Coffin appeared to
criticize the majority's intent formulation in terms of "chilling effect." 416 F.2d at 188. But it
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Smith Act conspiracy trials. As noted previously, the major consid-
eration of intent was given to the intent to overthrow, with the
conspiratorial intent to incite overthrow apparently assumed to
follow by implication.9 5 It goes without saying, however, that the
speech held "unambiguous" and clearly indicative of illicit intent
must be just that. Public statements embodying unpopular views or
vocal support for lawbreakers do not constitute evidence of intent
to solicit or counsel law violation.
"9 6
The second type of evidence set out by the Spock court to be
sufficiently demonstrative of conspiratorial intent is personal com-
mission of the offense alleged to be the object of the agreement.9 7
In the context of Spock, the necessary incriminating evidence would
have to be of solicitation to draft evasion. This type of evidence
raises few problems since it is relatively clear that if a person in fact
solicits draft law violations, he intended to do so. Quite obviously,
however, if sufficient evidence of commission of a substantive
crime exists, there is little need for recourse to a conspiracy
prosecution since action on the substantive offense would be con-
siderably more direct. Most speech conspiracy prosecutions have
been largely devoid of any evidence that those accused had them-
selves committed the substantive crime allegedly agreed to. Indeed,
it is often precisely because of this lack of evidence that the
conspiracy device is brought into use. 98
The third kind of evidence specified-evidence of an indi-
vidual defendant's subsequent legal acts "clearly undertaken for
the specific purpose of rendering effective the later illegal activity
which is advocated" 99-is more problematic, if only because the
is submitted that the free speech problems inhere not in the intent test, but in the lax
standards used by the majority to find conspiratorial agreement from the ill-defined and
amorphous activities of the Spock defendants. See text accompanying notes 125-33 infra. But
cf Epton v. New York, 390 U.S. 29, 32 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting in denial of writ of
certiorari).
, See notes 87-88 and accompanying text supra.
96 See Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966). Julian Bond expressed "admiration" for
those who burned their draft cards. The Supreme Court indicated that since he could not be
punished under the Selective Service laws for such expression, he could not be expelled
from the Georgia House of Representatives because of it. The Bond case was discussed by
the Spock majority. 416 F.2d at 171-72.
'7 See note 87 and accompanying text supra.
98 There was, for example, little or no evidence in either Dennis or Yates that any of
those indicted had themselves advocated violent revolution in the form of incitement to acts
of violence. The argument was that they directed or were "linked" to such advocacy through
their positions of Party leadership. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 328-33 (1957);
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 579 (1951) (Black J., dissenting); see notes 37, 50-52
and accompanying text supra.
99 416 F.2d at 173; see note 87 and accompanying text supra.
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court's language is unclear regarding precisely of what intent the
subsequent legal acts must be demonstrative. If the act must
indicate intent to advocate or solicit selective service violations, then
the evidence would be appropriate. If the evidence need only be
indicative of intent to bring about the "illegal activity which is
advocated" and not the advocacy itself, the test falls into the same
difficulty as the intent formulations of Yates: just as intent to
advocate violent revolution is not coequal with simple intent to
bring about overthrow, intent to solicit draft law violations is not
directly analogous to intent to "render effective" draft law viola-
tions. The discrete speech element of the crime to which the
conspiracy charge is appended must be encompassed in the intent
element, or a defendant may be found guilty of one crime upon
evidence of intent to commit another. Since this third type of
evidence was not introduced in Spock, difficulties with this aspect of
the test are not manifest in the outcome. Any further use of the
Spock intent standards should clarify the ambiguity.
Disagreement with other parts of the Spock opinion should not
obscure its accomplishment of tightening the intent standards of
Yates. The three-part typology of acceptable evidence of con-
spiratorial intent, with the needed clarification related above as to
the third category, could well serve as a model for future speech
conspiracy cases.
The Spock standards concerning conspiratorial agreement are
considerably less satisfactory. To begin with, they are never
explicitly set forth. But far more disturbing are the implicit as-
sumptions regarding agreement that must have been made by the
court of appeals in order to find even a possibility of culpability on
the part of any of the defendants.
The Call was clearly the crucial ingredient in all theories of
agreement advanced by both the Government and the appellate
court majority. A fundamental ambiguity regarding this document
pervaded the Government's case on agreement and the subsequent
circuit court discussion of the issue as well. The Government
apparently could not decide whether the Call (a) constituted the
agreement, (b) was part of the agreement, (c) was merely evidence
that an agreement existed, or (d) was an act in furtherance of a
prior agreement. Thus the brief submitted to the court by the
Government asserted that the Call "constituted, in addition to an
agreement, an instrument for furthering the agreement's purpose
of encouraging draft resistance." 100 Somewhat later in the brief,
100 Brief for the United States at 38, United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165 (lst Cir.
1969).
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however, it was stated that "[t]he 'Call to Resist,' the October 2
press conference, and the plans for the confrontation in
Washington were all part of an agreement to encourage and
support young men who were resisting the draft."''1 These charac-
terizations of the Call differ substantially from the Government's
theory of agreement put forward at the trial which posited the Call,
press conference, and the Washington demonstration as planned
results of a prior agreement. 0 2
Although much of the ambiguity in the Government's treat-
ment of the Call may have resulted from simple semantic impreci-
sion, the fundamental problem of which that confusion is indica-
tive constitutes one of the most crucial issues raised by Spock: the
legal significance that can be assigned to the composition of, or
formal adherence to, what is essentially a combination political
"broadside" and pledge of support for those who either have
broken the law or may contemplate such action.
The circuit court majority opinion is based on the unstated
assumption that such a document can in fact constitute a con-
spiratorial agreement, punishable as such when intent is indepen-
dently demonstrated. The court cited the Call, cover letter, and
press conference as evidence of "several instances of concerted
activity from which the jury could infer an agreement."' 0 3 Yet
implications from other parts of the opinion make it clear that the
fundamental agreement was embodied in the Call itself, the "act"
of agreement being the signing of the Call. The Call was the only
evidence discussed by the court in considering the question of
"whether the agreement contemplated or included illegal activ-
ity. 1' 0 4 In rejecting the defendants' contention that the Govern-
ment's theory of agreement would incriminate all those who signed
the Call, the court did not contend that a signature on the Call
could not constitute conspiratorial agreement, but rather put for-
ward its intent requirement as protective of signers who did not
intend to further the Call's allegedly criminal objectives.l °s In
addition, Ferber's directed acquittal on the basis of lack of agree-
ment appears to be directly attributable to the fact that he did not
sign the Call.'0 6
The defendants, as well as the circuit court dissent, argued on
three levels that a true conspiratorial agreement was not made out
101 Id. at 42 (emphasis added).
102 Id. at 31-35.
103 416 F.2d at 175-76.
104 Id. at 174-76.
105 Id. at 172-73.
106 See id. at 179.
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because the individuals being prosecuted did not constitute a
conspiratorial group. They argued, first, that the alleged confeder-
ation was completely public, whereas "every conspiracy is by. its
very nature secret."'10 7 Second, they insisted that the confederation
was "ill-defined, shifting, with many affiliations"; 108 it was, in other
words, noncohesive and completely undisciplined, whereas at least
minimal cohesion is essential to any conspiracy. Third, the defen-
dants urged that the agreement charged was so sprawling that it
was incapable of differentiating between the culpable and the
nonculpable.109
With respect to the first argument, clearly, the fact that a
conspiracy is open does not require the government to wait until a
substantive offense is perpetrated before acting. In the words of
the court, going "public" does not "pasteurize" an illegal en-
deavor. 110 Such openness does, however, at least partially under-
mine the rationale for use of conspiracy-the danger of ac-
complished harm is less when the conspiratorial activities are open
for.inspection and subject to imposition of attempt proceedings
should danger be deemed imminent. And the justification for the
loosening of evidence standards is weakened when the elements to
be proved are not of the covert nature usually associated with
conspiratorial endeavors. The point is not that open or public con-
spiracies are in some way immune from prosecution, but that they
do constitute a special situation in which, at least in past cases,111
additional factors have often been present which serve as added
justification for application of the conspiracy device to what at least
appears to be nonconspiratorial activity.
1 7 Id. at 185 n.2 (Coffin, J., dissenting), quoting Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S.
391, 402 (1957).
108 416 F.2d at 186 (Coffin, J., dissenting).
109 "There is no more reason to infer that these defendants were guilty of conspiracy
than to draw the same conclusion-obviously an absurd one-with respect to all persons who
joined in the public statements and demonstrations." Brief for Dr. Benjamin Spock at 27,
United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969).
110 416 F.2d at 169-70.
"I The Spock majority cited several cases involving "public conspiracies" that were in
fact prosecuted. Id. at 169-70 & n.8. Some of the indictments in those cases focused either on
specific meetings or on the publication of particular documents easily traceable to joint effort
of the accused. Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920); Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47 (1919); United States v. Gordon, 138 F.2d 174 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 798
(1943); Wells v. United States, 257 F. 605 (9th Cir. 1919). Other cases involved reasonably
cohesive organizations which served as a focus for the organizational activity absent in Spock.
Anderson v. United States, 273 F. 20 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 647 (1921); Haywood v.
United States, 268 F. 795 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 256 U.S. 689 (1920). Pierce, Schenck, and
Wells also involved cohesive organizations.
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One such factor common to the previously punished "public"
conspiracies was existence of a degree of cohesiveness or discipline
within the conspiratorial group-the kind of minimal cohesion
embodied in a political party, for instance, or in a less formal
group planning a specific meeting or publication. 1 ' Since the Spock
conspiracy lacked even this modicum of cohesiveness, the defen-
dants argued that it could not be punished, particularly in light of
its accompanying openness.'1 3 The court majority was able to rebut
this contention by citing a line of cases in which cohesiveness was
very nearly absent from the activity of the conspirators." 4 How-
ever, the precedents chosen-antitrust and other economic conspir-
acy cases-were not analogous to the facts of Spock in any other
respect. The antitrust cases did not involve open or public con-
spiracies; they did not concern -speech; they were often civil rather
than criminal actions; and mostimportant, their rather extensive
holdings were supported by additional justifications not present in
Spock. 1 15
The dangers involved in using Sherman Act antitrust conspir-
acy cases for guidance in nonrelated cases, particularly on the
question of agreement, are widely recognized. 1' 6 Even accepting
the economic cases cited by the majority as valid precedent on the
issue of cohesiveness," 7 the degree of economic concert inherently
necessary for the schemes therein involved indicated a kind of
united effort not present in Spock. Discipline and some cohesive-
12 See note I1I supra.
"z 416 F.2d at 175.
114 See, e.g., Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703 (1943) (conspiratorial
agreement to violate federal narcotics laws inferred from evidence that mailorder drug
company made frequent sales of unusually large quantities of morphine sulfate to doctor
over extended period); United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579 (2d Cir.), aff'd,311 U.S. 205
(1940) (conspiracy to operate illegal stills inferred from agreement among distributers of
sugar, yeast, and containers to sell to still operators).
"'S Economic conspiracy cases, especially those brought under the Sherman Act (15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970)) presented situations in which economic factors dictated near unanimity
of action on the part of those participating in restraint of trade. A price fixing agreement,
for example, is of necessity ineffective unless all parties maintain the same price. It is
arguable that this kind of dearly observable unanimity of action may indicate at least tacit
agreement. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939). Additional
concreteness has usually been lent to such amorphous undertakings by a clear economic
"stake in [the venture's] outcome." United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.),
aff'd, 311 U.S. 205 (1940). Neither of these factors was present to give substance to the
noncohesive agreement in Spock.
1"6 The loosening of agreement requirements in Sherman Act cases is by no means
generally applauded. See authorities cited note 30 supra. But "although they may be justified
in that area, [loosened standards] are ever likely to be extended to the general law of
conspiracy." Developments in the Law 934.
117 See notes 114-15 supra.
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ness are not, as implied by the Spock majority,' 1 8 necessary only to
keep a conspiracy secret; without minimal cohesiveness there is no
conspiracy. To discount the importance of these elements is to
undermine a major justification of conspiracy law: the harm feared
in conspiracy lies in the dangerous propensities of group criminal
action.11 9 If the "conspirators" are nothing more than a collection
of separate individuals, there can be no 'jointness" of action and
no rationale for applying conspiracy law. The requirement of
combination or relationship logically requires at least a modicum of
cohesiveness.1 20
The most telling argument against the finding of agreement,
and the one to which the majority devoted the most space,1 21 was
that the agreement charged was so wide-ranging that it was inca-
pable of discriminating between tt~e culpable and the nonculpable.
Because the majority looked to the, Gall as the essential element of
the conspiratorial agreement,, nd because the Call was interpreted
as including both legal and illegal aspects, the majority had to meet
the objection that all signers of the Call might thereby be held
liable as conspirators, even if they subscribed only to its purely
legal aspects. The majority dealt with this argument by drawing a
direct parallel to the Smith Act membership clause cases in which
the Supreme Court relied on the requirement of specific intent to
overthrow the government as the means of protecting innocent
members of the Communist Party who did not intend to further its
illegal goals.1 22 The three-part specific intent formulation discussed
previously 23 was then set out by the Spock majority as adequate
protection of the innocent "[w]hen the alleged agreement is both
bifarious and political within the shadow of the First Amend-
ment."1
24
18 416 F.2d at 170 n.9.
'9 See text accompanying notes 21-22 supra.
120 See G. WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 666-69.
121 416 F.2d at 172-74.
122 The court placed particular emphasis on the Supreme Court decisions in Scales v.
United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961), and Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961):
In Scales the Court held that protection for the innocent cotild be adequately
accomplished by requiring that the defendants' specific illegal intent be proved to
the degree demanded in Noto v. United States .... "[Ciriminal intent ... must be
judged strictissimijuris, for otherwise there is a danger that one in sympathy with the
legitimate aims of such an organization, but not specifically intending to accomplish
them by resort to violence, might be punished for his adherence to lawful and
constitutionally protected purposes, because of other and unprotected purposes
which he does not necessarily share."
416 F.2d at 172-73; see note 31 supra.
13 See text accompanying note 87 supra.
124 416 F.2d at 173.
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The essential deficiency in the majority's approach is its facile
analogy of the agreement implied by membership in the Com-
munist Party to the agreement implied by affixing one's signature
to the Call. Technically, the crime defined by the membership
clause cases is not conspiracy at all, since it requires no agreement
but simply active membership in an organization which advocates
violent overthrow plus intent to effect that overthrow. It could,
however, be argued that active and knowing membership in an
organization such as the Communist Party may be taken to be the
functional equivalent of agreement, given the special nature of the
Party, its "ironclad" discipline, and its undemocratic procedures for
making and enforcing policy. The membership clause cases do
require an active commitment to what is a cohesive, disciplined
political organization with reasonably clear-cut illegal goals. In this
precise context, specific intent may be enough to protect innocent
Party members. But membership in an organization such as the
Communist Party is far different from the amorphous agreement
represented by the Call.
The majority's rationale collapsed when it first identified sign-
ing the Call and cover letter with conspiratorial agreement. Even if
participation in the press conference served as additional evidence
of agreement, such an action could not begin to resemble the af-
firmative commitment embodied in, for example, active knowing
membership in the Communist Party. The almost complete lack of
cohesion among the several hundred signers of the Call means that
any societal danger from the group arose from the parallel-but
not united-intentions of the signers; and consciously parallel
action 'should not support the use of conspiracy in the absence of
some degree of group identity or cohesiveness, at least not in a
case such as Spock.125 Most basically the Call cannot constitute the
"continuous and conscious union of wills upon a common under-
taking"' 26 that must serve as the criminal act of conspiracy. That
some of the Spock defendants harbored an intent to engage in
illegal advocacy is relatively clear; that these individual intents were
united continuously and consciously into a joint endeavor merely
by the act of signing the Call or speaking at the press conference is
not at all clear. Without this second element, the crime of conspir-
acy cannot be made out.
Even if the Call itself did not present prima facie proof of
125 The "consciously parallel action" formula for agreement is problematic in the
antitrust area as well. See note 30 supra.
126 Developments in the Law 926.
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agreement, as was implied by the court majority, it still is possible
that the Call, together with the other circumstantial evidence pre-
sented at the trial, might have served as sufficient indirect proof of
a prior agreement to support a jury conviction. As discussed
previously, the logic of agreement requires a definable relationship
or combination existent among several individuals aimed at an
illegal act. 127 The difficulty of inferring existence of any sort of
culpable agreement from the evidence submitted in Spock centers
on the issue of finding a definable relationship or combination-a
question not discussed in the majority opinion, apparently because
signing the Call was viewed as sufficient evidence of concerted
endeavor to constitute the act of agreeing.
The record supports a finding that some illegal action was
taking place: specifically, the Arlington Street Church meeting and
the Washington draft card turn-in very probably constituted com-
mission of the substantive crime of counseling or aiding and
abetting draft law violation. 12 8 There was also evidence of some
cooperation, but. only in nonculpable activities-the writing of the
Call, for example, and the agreement to speak at the press confer-
ence. In addition, there was evidence of intent, at least as to some
of. the defendants, to engage in future illegal acts of criminal
solicitation. 2 9 But the key point is that there was no unifying
agreement to connect these various elements. The illegal acts in
evidence were not logically the product of joint action of the
alleged conspirators; the only evidence of cooperation, combina-
tion, or relationship among the defendants culminated in action
pursuant to wholly legal ends. In short, there was no support for
finding a definable criminal combination. Evidence of cooperative
action in legal activities plus individual intent to commit illegal acts
does not add up to a conspiratorial agreement to pursue jointly
those illegal objectives.' 30 Confederation in advancement of legal
127 See text accompanying notes 23-26 supra.
128 That the church meeting might be used as the focus of a more specific and discrete
conspiracy indictment was conceded by the dissent. 416 F.2d at 186 (Coffin, J., dissenting).
129 See notes 90-92 and accompanying text supra.
130 See text accompanying note 59 supra. An analogous situation would be presented by
evidence of a meeting of bank robbers at which several of them announced that they had
robbed banks in the past and intended to continue to do so. Subsequent robberies commit-
ted by individuals who so spoke would not justify an inference of conspiratorial agreement
unless independent evidence suggested cooperation in executing those robberies. The words
spoken at the meeting would be demonstrative of individual intent but not of agreement.
The Spock press conference was of no more legal significance on the question of agreement.
A distinction must be made between "agreement" in terms of similarity of viewpoint on
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ends does not establish conspiratorial agreement. Conspiracy, as
composed of both mental assent and combination, is simply not
demonstrated by the record in United States v. Spock.
It is no small irony that this serious defect in the Spock
conspiracy standards for agreement provoked considerable criti-
cism of the one real accomplishment of the majority opinion-its
three-part evidence standard for the finding of conspiratorial in-
tent. 13 1 Both the dissenting opinion 132 and subsequent commen-
tary 33 decried the intent test on first amendment grounds because
of an accurate perception that the majority had set a precedent for
punishing individuals for conspiracy upon no more evidence than
undeniably legal speech. The critics alleged that the decision was
too broad and would therefore have a "chilling effect" on free
speech. 134
These attacks were misdirected. If, as argued above, the Call
had little or no legal significance as an indication of conspiratorial
agreement, the majority set a precedent for allowing a finding of
conspiracy solely on the basis of individual intent to commit an
illegal act. This precedent is clearly a very dangerous one, but not
primarily on first amendment grounds. Such a practice would
constitute punishment for an illicit intent alone, in violation of the
ancient common law requirement of a culpable act. Signing a
document such as the Call cannot by itself constitute acquiescence
in a conspiratorial agreement, and the punishment of conspiracy
without agreement violates not only the underlying rationale of the
crime but also due process requirements of individual guilt.
public issues, and a conspiratorial agreement involving a joint decision to pursue an illegal
course of action.
131 See text accompanying note 87 supra.
132 Judge Coffin expressed his displeasure with the ramifications of the majority's test as
follows:
What are the implications of the three methods of activating one's signature to
the "Call" to status as a full-fledged conspirator? To say that prior or subsequent
unambiguous statements change the color of the litmus is to say that while one
exercise of First Amendment rights is protected, two are not. To say that actual
commission of illegal acts ... renders culpahle the more opaque original "agree-
ment" is to say simply that the suhsequent commission of one crime becomes
suddenly the commission of two crimes. To say that "subsequent legal acts clearly
undertaken for rendering effective the advocated illegal action" . . . [render]
retrospectively conspiratorial the earlier protected ambiguous advocacy is to say
that two rights make a wrong.
416 F.2d at 187 (dissenting opinion).
"' See, e.g., Filvaroff, supra note 14, at 228; Note, Conspiracy and the First Amendment, 79
YALE L.J. 872, 886 (1970).
134 See Nathanson supra note 14.
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CONCLUSION
The Spock case sets the doctrinal deficiencies of Yates into bold
relief. The precise intent standards set out by the circuit court in
Spock demonstrate the internal weaknesses of the speech conspiracy
doctrine of the Communist cases. And the breakdown in the Spock
agreement standards serves to illustrate the inapplicability of the
Communist cases-whatever their internal strengths and
weaknesses-to the speech conspiracy cases that might be expected
to occur in the near future. Spock, however, also provides some
rather clear indications of the direction the Supreme Court might
take in a future case of a similar nature.
The intent standards, as discussed at some length above,
provide a suggestion of how the Court might remove the current
possibility of a speech conspiracy defendant's being found guilty of
a crime without the relevant mens rea. The problems with the
agreement element of conspiracy, so conspicuous in Spock, dem-
onstrate clearly the need for specificity in conspiracy charges, and
the importance of disentangling agreement in terms of a joint
illegal undertaking from a conception of agreement as the con-
vergence of views on issues of public concern. Agreement, at least
in speech conspiracy cases, must consist of that joint undertaking,
not merely parallel action.
If the strengths and weaknesses of Spock are taken seriously by
future prosecutors, there might even be hope for a continuance of
the current lull in speech conspiracy prosecutions, particularly if
some variation of the Spock intent test is made a, constitutional
requirement, and if the agreement standards are tightened so as to
require agreement in traditional conspiracy terms. The rationale
for conspiracy requires its confinement to speech cases in which the
primary governmental concern is the punishment of individuals
who (1) present a clear case of conspiratorial agreement and intent
directed at illegal and dangerous speech and (2) cannot be effec-
tively reached on a substantive charge. The recent past has dem-
onstrated the danger to the integrity of the legal process from
excessive use of the conspiracy device to reach political
offenders-especially those charged with speech crimes. 135 Pru-
dence alone dictates what the first amendment may not: use of a
35 That the 1969 Chicago Conspiracy Trial, for example, generated little public esteem
for the American judiciary is widely acknowledged. See, e.g., Kalven, Chicago Howler, THE
NEW REPUBLIC, March 7, 1970, at 21. Professor Kalven called the trial "a mess and a loss for
the society as a whole." Id. at 23. See also J. LuKAs, supra note 5; J. MITORD, supra note 84; J.
NELSON & R. OsTRow, THE FBI AND THE BERRIGANS: THE MAKING OF A CONSPIRACY (1972).
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less dangerous alternative to speech conspiracy proceedings, espe-
cially in light of the declining Government conviction rate in recent
political conspiracy trials. 136
Above all, when conspiracy is applied to speech crimes, both
short-term concern for insuring fairness to all defendants in crimi-
nal proceedings and long-term regard for preserving citizen
confidence in the probity of the courts militate against any use of
conspiracy to punish those who cannot be incriminated without
perversion of the substantive and procedural safeguards embodied
in conspiracy law, the due process clauses, and the first amend-
ment. A statement by Mr. Justice Jackson aptly describes the
standard which should restrain both the prosecutor in bringing
speech conspiracy charges and the appellate courts-particularly
the Supreme Court-in upholding them. It might also serve as the
ultimate lesson of Yates and Spock:
There is . .. strong temptation to relax rigid standards when it
seems the only way to sustain convictions of evildoers. But
statutes authorize prosecution for substantive crimes for most
evildoing without the dangers to the liberty of the individual and
the integrity of the judicial process that are inherent in conspir-
acy charges. We should disapprove the doctrine of implied or
constructive crime in its entirety and in every manifestation. And
1 think there should be no straining to uphold any conspiracy
conviction where prosecution for the substantive offense is
adequate and the purpose served by adding the conspiracy
charge seems chiefly to get procedural advantages to ease the
way to conviction. 137
' See N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1973, § 4, at E-3, col. 3.
137 Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 457 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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